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THE CHOICE IS (NOT) YOURS: WHY THE SEC
MUST FURTHER AMEND ITS RULES OF
PRACTICE TO INCREASE FAIRNESS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
ABSTRACT
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) plays an extremely
important role within the securities industry—it oversees the financial
markets, protects consumers, and maintains market efficiency. One of the
most important (and recently one of most criticized) responsibilities of the
SEC is its duty to enforce the securities laws and punish violators. During
the past two decades, and especially after the implementation of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, the SEC’s
Division of Enforcement has grown substantially and has utilized
administrative enforcement proceedings at an increasing rate. However, this
utilization has been occurring without any substantial change to its Rules of
Practice and without any formal process by which it chooses a forum. The
SEC recently amended its Rules of Practice in hopes to hush the critics and
restore confidence, but the underlying problems still have not been
completely remedied. In order to rectify these issues, this Note argues the
SEC must further revise its Rules of Practice in order to create stricter
guidelines regarding choice of forum, extend the discovery timeline for
respondents, increase the number of depositions allotted to respondents, and
reduce the admissibility of hearsay.
INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) has
many responsibilities within the securities industry, but perhaps currently its
most important is its duty to enforce and ensure compliance with securities
laws and regulations.1 During the past two decades, and especially after the
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank), the SEC’s Division of Enforcement
has grown substantially and has utilized administrative enforcement
proceedings at a steadily increasing rate.2 Although the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce,3 as well as investors and other market participants, recognize that
1. See About the SEC: What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 10, 2013), http:
//www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#create [hereinafter About the SEC].
2. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins With In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803.
3. The Chamber of Commerce is a lobbying entity that works with more than 1,500 volunteers
from member corporations, organizations, and the academic community who serve on committees,
subcommittees, task forces, and councils to develop and implement policy on major issues affecting
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this enforcement process sufficiently protects the public from violators of the
federal securities laws,4 recently, there has been a rising concern as to
whether the SEC is abusing its power as a regulator and creating a biased
forum in which defendants’ cases are heard.5
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is particularly concerned about the
SEC’s recent use of its enforcement powers and has issued official
recommendations to the SEC as to how it can fix the present flaws in its
administrative process.6 The Chamber of Commerce recognized problems
such as inconsistencies of law and policy between the SEC’s administrative
process and federal district courts, loose guidelines concerning choice of
forum, the admissibility of hearsay, and a considerably shorter discovery
period as compared to that found in federal procedure.7 This Note argues that
changes must be made to the SEC’s administrative proceedings in order to
ensure fairness, due process, and consistency. To solve these problems, the
SEC should further revise its Rules of Practice in order to create stricter
guidelines regarding choice of forum, extend the discovery timeline for
respondents, increase the number of depositions allotted to respondents, and
reduce the admissibility of hearsay.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the SEC to illustrate the
evolution of its enforcement authority; from its limited foundations in 1934
to the expansive authority the SEC exhibits today. Part II outlines the SEC’s
current administrative hearing process post-Dodd-Frank, highlighting the
duties and powers of an administrative law judge (ALJ), the appeal process,
and the discovery limitations. Part III explores the policy-based criticisms
facing the SEC in connection with its administrative hearing process and
examines whether the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s recommendations
achieve the goal of addressing these recent concerns about the SEC’s
proceedings. Part IV describes the amendments the SEC has adopted in
response to such criticisms and recommendations. Finally, Part V introduces
alternative solutions for improving the SEC’s administrative proceedings,
including extending the overall length of the proceedings, increasing the
amount of permitted depositions, prohibiting the admissibility of hearsay,
and implementing a rigid procedure for choosing a forum.
business. See About the U.S. Chamber: Advocacy, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://www.us
chamber.com/about-us/about-us-chamber/advocacy (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
4. See U.S. Chamber’s CCMC Releases Report on SEC Enforcement Practices, Provides
Recommendations for Improvement, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (July 15, 2015, 9:15 AM),
https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-s-ccmc-releases-report-sec-enforcement-
practices-provides-recommendations.
5. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
21, 2014, 9:40 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-judges-it-appoints-
1413849590 [hereinafter Eaglesham, SEC Steering More Trials].
6. See generally CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, EXAMINING U.S. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES
AND PRACTICES (2015) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES].
7. Id. at 3–4, 21.
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I. HISTORY OF THE SEC AND ITS ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
A. CREATION OF THE SEC
On July 2, 1934, the Federal Trade Commission voted to create the SEC8
following various Congressional hearings that were held in order to increase
investor confidence, which had crashed along with the stock market in 1929.9
Congress passed the Securities Act of 193310 and subsequently the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (collectively, the Acts),11 which together created the
SEC.12 The principle functions of the SEC at this time were simple—it aimed
to ensure that public companies disclosed the truth about their businesses,
securities, and risks in order to ensure that players within the securities
industry, specifically retail investors, were treated fairly.13
The Acts initially did not grant the SEC extensive enforcement powers
and thus it could only punish securities laws violators by seeking injunctions
in federal district court.14 The only way the SEC could utilize its
administrative proceedings “was to suspend or expel members or officers of
national securities exchanges.”15 Over the next few decades, the number of
actions brought by the SEC increased and thus, so did the need for a larger,
yet more focused, enforcement division.16 Therefore, in 1972, the
Commission combined all of its scattered enforcement programs into its own
single division called the Division of Enforcement, which now has the
authority to oversee all enforcement actions brought by the SEC.17
B. THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONSACT OF 1984 AND THE
INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD ENFORCEMENTACT
OF 1988
Up until the 1980s, the only power that the SEC had to combat securities
law violators was to seek an injunction in federal district court,18 which
usually accomplished nothing more than an order that the defendant must
8. See Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of the
History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 368,
n.1 (2008).
9. See About the SEC, supra note 1.
10. See generally Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)).
11. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012)).
12. See About the SEC, supra note 1.
13. Id.
14. See Jed S. Rakoff, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court S. Dist. of N.Y., Keynote Address at the PLI
Regulation Institute: Is the SEC Becoming a Law Unto Itself? (Nov. 5, 2014).
15. Id.
16. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 8, at 374.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 386.
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comply with the law in the future.19However, as the amount of insider trading
cases grew, injunctions were no longer considered adequate because they did
not punish the violator. Since the violator was “placed in no worse position
than the honest man” who did not break the law, the deterrent effect was
minimal.20 Therefore, Congress passed the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984 (ITSA),21 which allowed the SEC to penalize violators through treble
damage awards in federal insider trading cases and increased the maximum
fine for Exchange Act violations from $10,000 to $100,000.22
It did not take long for the SEC and Congress to realize that ITSA was
not doing enough to deter violators.23 Therefore, only four years later,
Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
of 1988 (ITSFEA).24 ITSFEA’s paramount advancement was its
authorization of the SEC to bring an action in federal district court and
impose civil penalties on “a person who, at the time of the violation, directly
or indirectly controlled the person who committed such violation.”25 This
meant that broker-dealer and investment advisory firms, although merely the
employers of the violators who actually committed insider trading, were now
liable under the SEC’s enforcement provisions. ITSFEA also intensified
criminal penalties by increasing the maximum fine for violations from
$100,000 to $1 million.26
C. THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENTREMEDIES AND PENNY STOCK
REFORM ACT OF 1990
Until this point, the SEC’s main purpose for its enforcement actions “was
to provide remedial relief for aggrieved investors and to deter future
violations.”27 However, by the late 20th century, it was evident that the SEC
was pushing toward a new justification for enforcing the securities laws—to
punish the violators.28 The SEC sought, and Congress granted, the ability to
issue cease-and-desist and disgorgement orders against any violator of a
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. See generally Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
22. Id.
23. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 8, at 387 (“In the mid-1980s, insider-trading scandals
dominated the financial news and involved such high-profile Wall Street traders as Ivan Boesky,
Michael Milken, and Dennis Levine. [It] became the focus of Congressional hearings in June and
July 1986 and continued to be the focus of hearings for the next several years.”).
24. See generally Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, § 1, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
25. Id. § 3.
26. See id.
27. Atkins & Bondi, supra note 8, at 383.
28. See id.
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securities law,29 through the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
Stock Reform Act of 1990 (Remedies Act).30
Through the Remedies Act, Congress greatly increased the SEC’s
punitive power, but did so while taking certain precautions.31 First, the
Remedies Act authorized the SEC to impose monetary penalties through its
administrative proceedings, but only when the violator was an entity directly
registered with the SEC, such as a broker-dealer or investment advisor.32
Second, if the SEC wished to seek civil monetary penalties from entities not
registered with the SEC, its only choice of forum was federal district court.33
Due to these specific enforcement provisions, the SEC only brought four
actions in federal district court seeking monetary penalties against issuers
between 1990 and 2002, with the amount of penalties not exceeding $5
million.34
D. THE SARBANES-OXLEYACT OF 2002
After major corporate scandals involving large companies such as Enron
Corp. and WorldCom Inc.,35 Congress further extended the SEC’s power to
enforce both old and new securities laws.36 Congress passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley),37 which not only “imposed significant,
additional requirements on corporations and their officers and directors” to
strengthen their corporate governance, but also “greatly expanded . . . the
criminal penalties for violating the federal securities laws.”38
Specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley granted the SEC the authority to bar
persons from serving as officers and directors, a power that was previously
vested solely in the federal courts.39 However, perhaps the most significant
expansion of the SEC’s enforcement authority was granted through Section
308(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley, otherwise known as the “Fair Funds” provision.40
This provision gave the SEC power to require violators to pay a civil penalty,
29. Id. at 392.
30. See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012)).
31. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 8, at 392.
32. 25 MARC I. STEINBERG& RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL& STATE
ENFORCEMENT § 6:1 (2015).
33. The Dodd-Frank Act Reinforces and Expands SEC Enforcement Powers, GIBSON DUNN
(July 21, 2010), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/Dodd-FrankActReinforcesAnd
ExpandsSECEnforcementPowers.aspx [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act Reinforces SEC].
34. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 8, at 394.
35. See generally Dan Ackman, WorldCom, Tyco, Enron—R.I.P., FORBES (July 1, 2002, 9:32
AM), http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/01/0701topnews.html.
36. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 8, at 394–95.
37. See generally Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
38. Atkins & Bondi, supra note 8, at 395.
39. See id.; see also Sarbanes-Oxley § 1105(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u–3 (2012).
40. Sarbanes-Oxley § 308(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a).
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which would be paid out to harmed shareholders, but only if disgorgement41
was present.42 Congress purposely required disgorgement before the SEC
could issue civil penalties so it would focus on paying shareholders back, not
only punishing the wrongdoers.43 However, the SEC would often dodge this
requirement by imposing a disgorgement amount of $1 and then choosing
whichever large civil penalty it desired.44 Consequently, the Fair Funds
provision has had a paradoxical effect on shareholders—when the SEC issues
large monetary penalties against securities law violators, this amount
ultimately comes out of the shareholders’ pockets.45
Notwithstanding the negative ramifications of the Fair Funds provision,
the SEC was not deterred from penalizing violators. The SEC’s expanded
powers had a dramatic effect on the securities industry. In the years following
the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, there was a substantial increase in the
amount of monetary penalties the SEC imposed,46 as well as an increased
number of officer and director bars.47
E. THEDODD-FRANKWALL STREETREFORM ANDCONSUMER
PROTECTIONACT OF 2010
During the early 2000s, many entities were lending out subprime
mortgages due to weakened mortgage underwriting standards.48 This
abundance of bad credit led to the bursting of the “housing bubble” and then,
ultimately, the recession in 2008.49 After this period of economic turbulence,
it was time yet again for Congress to promulgate legislation to address the
underlying causes. In July 2010, President Obama signed into law Dodd-
41. Disgorgement is “a repayment of ill-gotten gains that is imposed on wrong-doers by the
courts. Funds that were received through illegal or unethical business transactions are disgorged, or
paid back, with interest to those affected by the action. Disgorgement is a remedial civil action,
rather than a punitive civil action.” Definition of Disgorgement, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.invest
opedia.com/terms/d/disgorgement.asp#ixzz3pW8c3P9z (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
42. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 8, at 395; see also Sarbanes-Oxley § 308(a).
43. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE SARBANES
OXLEYACT OF 2002 1, https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf.
44. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 8, at 398.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 400 (“The total amount of issuer penalties in 2003 and 2004 was greater than the
total amount of all penalties imposed by the SEC for the prior fifteen years combined. From 2003
through 2007, approximately $13.8 billion in disgorgement and civil penalties were ordered to be
paid to the SEC, courts, or other appointed trustees.”); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2007
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2 (2007).
47. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 8, at 399 (citing U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT
ON THECURRENT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGECOMMISSION 25
(2006) (“In 2004, 170 director and officer bars were entered—more than three times as many
entered in 2001.”)).
48. See Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the Resulting
Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 120 (2009).
49. See id.
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Frank, which further expanded the enforcement powers of the SEC.50 Perhaps
the most important provision of Dodd-Frank is Section 929P, Strengthening
Enforcement by the Commission, which broadly expanded the SEC’s
authority to utilize its administrative proceedings.51 Through this provision,
Congress authorized the SEC to bring civil monetary actions against any
player within the securities industry, registered or non-registered, in its own
administrative forum.52 Dodd-Frank also gave the SEC the power to impose
liability on those who recklessly aided and abetted securities law violators,53
award whistleblowers for informing the SEC of illegal conduct,54 and bar
directors and officers within its administrative proceedings.55
II. CURRENT SEC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
The SEC has the option to bring a case in one of two forums: an SEC
administrative proceeding or federal district court. After the passage of
Dodd-Frank, the SEC increased the amount of cases brought within its own
administrative proceedings, since the Commission was now allowed to seek
penalties from any individual or entity, not only those registered with the
SEC.56 If the SEC chooses to bring a case within its own administrative
proceedings, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence do not apply;
instead, the SEC uses its own Rules of Practice.57
A. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ANDHEARINGOFFICERS
Cases brought within the SEC’s administrative proceedings are presided
over by a hearing officer, and if so ordered by the SEC, an ALJ.58 ALJs are
not elected by the citizens of the United States, but rather are selected by the
Chief Administrative Law Judge, whose powers are designated by the SEC.59
50. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31,
and 42 U.S.C.).
51. Nate Raymond, U.S. Judge Criticizes SEC Use of In-House Court for Fraud Cases,
REUTERS (Nov. 5, 2014, 1:37 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/sec-fraud-rakoff-idUSL1N0S
V2LN20141105.
52. Dodd-Frank § 929P(a) (amending Securities Act § 8A, Securities Exchange Act § 21B(a),
Investment Company Act § 9(d)(1), and Investment Advisers Act § 203(i)(1)).
53. Id. § 929O (amending Securities Act § 15(b), Securities Exchange Act § 20(e), and
Investment Company Act § 48(b)).
54. Id. § 922 (amending Securities Exchange Act § 21).
55. Id. § 925 (amending Securities Exchange Act §§ 15(b)(6)(A), 15B(c)(4) and 17A(c)(4)(C),
and Investment Advisers Act § 203(f)).
56. See Mark Kornfeld, Jessie Gabriel & David Choi, Administrative Proceedings Remain
Likely for SEC Enforcement Actions, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.newyorklawjournal.
com/id=1202767976167/Administrative-Proceedings-Remain-Likely-for-SEC-Enforcement-Acti
ons?mcode=1202615326010&curindex=1&curpage=ALL.
57. See generally Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.100–900 (2016).
58. Id. § 201.110.
59. Id. §§ 201.30–10.
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Since there is no right to a jury trial,60 the hearing officer or ALJ presides
over the entire proceeding and makes the initial decision.61 In addition to the
general responsibility of ensuring the “fair and orderly conduct of the
proceedings,”62 the SEC granted hearing officers and ALJs the powers of:
(a) [a]dministering oaths and affirmations; (b) [i]ssuing subpoenas . . . (c)
[r]eceiving relevant evidence and ruling upon the admission of evidence . .
. (e) [h]olding prehearing and other conferences . . . (h) [s]ubject to any
limitations set forth elsewhere in these Rules of Practice, considering and
ruling upon all procedural and other motions . . . [and] (i) [p]reparing an
initial decision. . . .63
The Rules of Practice outline additional powers of hearing officers and ALJs,
and also highlight that the list is not exhaustive.64
B. GENERAL PROCEDURE
Once the SEC chooses the administrative proceeding as its forum, the
SEC, in its discretion, has either 120, 210, or 300 days from the date of the
service order to file an initial decision, which determines whether or not the
defendant is guilty of the alleged violation.65 When choosing a time period,
the SEC considers “the nature, complexity, and urgency of the subject matter,
and with due regard for the public interest and the protection of investors.”66
Under the 300-day timeline, after a hearing officer or ALJ issues a service
order, there must be a hearing within four months.67 Therefore, the time
between order issuance and a hearing only decreases as the time period for
filing an initial decision decreases.68 If a hearing officer does not feel that the
given time period grants sufficient time to gather all of the evidence and make
a well-informed initial decision, he or she can request an extension from the
Chief Administrative Law Judge.69 The Rules of Practice specify that only a
hearing officer may request an extension; respondents in a case do not have
the same ability to request an extension.70
However, if the respondent is not pleased with the initial decision, then
the respondent can file a “petition for review” with the SEC.71 This petition
for review is basically an appeal to the SEC; the Division of Enforcement can
also file such a petition in the event that the SEC is not satisfied with the
60. See id. § 201.110.
61. See id. § 201.360(a)(1).
62. Id. § 200.14(a).
63. Id. § 201.111.
64. See id.




69. See id. § 201.360(a)(3).
70. See id.
71. Id. § 201.410(a).
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initial ruling.72 The SEC can “affirm, reverse, modify, set aside or remand for
further proceedings, in whole or in part,” a hearing officer’s or ALJ’s initial
decision.73 The SEC also has the power to review an initial decision “on its
own initiative,” even if neither party appealed.74 If neither party files a
petition for review, and the SEC chooses not to review the matter, then the
SEC “will issue an order that the decision has become final as to that party.”75
After this order is issued, the decision is final.76
If the respondent has petitioned for SEC review and is still not pleased
with the final decision, then he or she may appeal again to the U.S. Court of
Appeals within sixty days of the final decision’s issuance, in the respondent’s
residential circuit or in the District of Columbia Circuit.77 Once this petition
is filed, the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction “to affirm or modify and
enforce or to set aside the order in whole or in part.”78 The circuit court also
has the power to remand the matter back to the SEC if either party shows that
there is additional, material evidence that was not introduced during the
administrative hearing and there is a “reasonable ground” for failure to
introduce this evidence.79
III. CURRENT ISSUES WITH THE SEC’S ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
Recently, the SEC’s administrative proceedings have been the target of
abundant criticism.80 Some opponents have condemned the SEC and its
administrative process for shaping securities laws in whichever way it
chooses, at times even discounting what federal courts have ruled on identical
issues.81 Other critics, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, have credited
the SEC’s extremely high success rate in its administrative proceedings
solely to its unfettered discretion in choosing a forum.82 There are also
72. See id.
73. Id. § 201.411(a).
74. Id. § 201.411(c).
75. Id. § 201.360(d)(2).
76. See id.
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2012).
78. Id. § 78y(a)(4).
79. Id. § 78y(a)(5).
80. See generally Rakoff, supra note 14 (claiming that federal courts are in a better position than
the SEC to impartially interpret securities laws); see also Eaglesham, supra note 2 (explaining that
when the SEC brings a case before its own judges, the chances of SEC success increases).
81. See Geoffrey F. Aronow, Back to the Future: The Use of Administrative Proceedings for
Enforcement at the CFTC and SEC, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Jan.–Feb. 2015, at 1;
RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 9.
82. See RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 18; see also Raymond,
supra note 51; Heading to Court, But Which One?, INVESTMENTNEWS (Mar. 1, 2015, 12:01 AM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150301/REG/303019994/heading-to-court-but-which-
one [hereinafter Heading to Court].
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procedural criticisms concerning the admittance of hearsay and the very short
time period allotted to respondents for discovery.83
A. POLICYCONCERNS WITHCONSISTENCY ANDDEFERENCE
One of the problems that stems from the SEC’s administrative process is
its ability to develop securities law in its own way, in some cases essentially
disregarding precedent promulgated by federal courts on identical issues.84
Since it is an expert on securities regulation, the SEC obviously has abundant
knowledge to interpret its own statutes and regulations. However, it has
recently been argued that deference to the SEC’s expertise has gone too far.85
The SEC’s discretion in statutory interpretation has “even applied in cases in
which the Commission adopts a legal position that is inconsistent with or
directly contradicts existing appellate court rulings.”86
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Reserve Defense Council, Inc.,87 the
Supreme Court provided guidelines as to when a federal court should defer
to a government agency’s interpretation of its own regulation.88 First, the
court must consider whether Congress has already determined a clear
interpretation of the matter at hand.89 If it has, then the court and the agency
must abide by Congress’ express intent.90 If Congress has not addressed the
issue, the court cannot apply its own meaning or definition to the regulation
or statute.91 Instead, the question for the court becomes “whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”92 The opinion
reiterates that the Supreme Court has accepted the longstanding “principle of
deference to administrative interpretations” and that it should give
“considerable weight” to an executive agency’s construction of a statute.93
The Court concluded that,
[w]hen a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather
than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress,
the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges—who have no
constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by
those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public
83. See RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 16, 21.
84. See Aronow, supra note 81, at 3.
85. See Rakoff, supra note 14.
86. RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 9.
87. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
88. See id. at 842–45.
89. See id. at 842.
90. See id. at 842–43.
91. See id. at 843.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 844.
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interest are not judicial ones: Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in
the political branches.94
Through this holding, the Supreme Court established that executive agencies
are better equipped to assess their own regulations and address public policy
arguments; such is not the duty of the courts.95 However, the SEC, as well as
federal district courts, may be extending the “Chevron deference” beyond the
Supreme Court’s intended scope.
The reality is that these administrative proceedings within the SEC allow
for a full briefing and oral argument and end with a decision made by a
hearing officer or ALJ. These decisions are sometimes given more weight by
federal district courts than the decisions made by federal courts themselves.96
For example, in VanCook v. SEC,97 the Second Circuit gave deference to the
SEC’s interpretation of a certain rule although the same court had previously
interpreted it differently.98 The Second Circuit stated that “this later
interpretation . . . ‘trumps’ our prior interpretation.”99 While some may take
the position that these hearing officers and ALJs have superior expertise in
securities law and should make these decisions, many believe that the law is
better off being developed by the federal courts.100 Administrative decisions
are presumed correct “unless the decision is not within the range of
reasonable interpretations.”101 However, decisions of federal district courts
are subject to de novo review by the Court of Appeals, and then possibly
again by the Supreme Court.102 This stricter standard of review, as compared
to “the range of reasonable interpretations” standard, ensures consistency and
stability in the legal system. The disparity between decisions of the SEC and
federal courts “hinders the balanced development of the securities laws.”103
B. U.S. CHAMBER OFCOMMERCERECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
SEC
In July 2015, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Center for Capital Markets
Competitiveness released a report examining the SEC’s enforcement
practices and providing recommendations to improve them.104 Since
Congress passed Dodd-Frank in 2010, the SEC has obtained the power to
94. Id. at 866 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. See id. at 864.
96. See Aronow, supra note 81, at 3.
97. See VanCook v. SEC, 653 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2011).
98. See id. at 140.
99. Id. at 140 n.8.
100. See Aronow, supra note 81, at 3.
101. Rakoff, supra note 14.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See Marie Cabural, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Urges SEC to Improve Enforcement
Practices, VALUEWALK (July 15, 2015, 7:06 PM), http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/07/u-s-cham
ber-of-commerce-sec/.
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bring an enforcement action in either district court or as an administrative
proceeding.105 As evidenced by the SEC’s unique administrative hearing
process, the difference between forums “can have a significant impact on the
procedural rights of a defendant/respondent and, ultimately, on the
respondent’s ability to obtain a full, fair, and impartial adjudication.”106 In its
recommendations, the Chamber of Commerce attempts to present solutions
to these discrepancies while keeping the mission of the SEC—”promoting
investor protection, competition, and capital formation”107—in mind. The
following discussion focuses on only the first, second, and fourth of the
twenty-eight total recommendations the Chamber of Commerce made, since
these specific recommendations pertain to the issues this Note analyzes.108
1. Recommendation One: Adoption of Formal SEC Forum
Selection Policy
The Chamber of Commerce’s first recommendation concerns the need
for a solidified procedure the SEC must follow when choosing a forum.109
Beyond the SEC’s winning record, the current, flexible choice of forum
process creates an inconsistent interpretation of securities law and policy
between the SEC’s interpretations and those of the federal courts.110 This
Chamber of Commerce recommendation urges the SEC to “adopt a policy to
refrain from using its administrative forum as an avenue to adopt new
interpretations of the federal securities laws or to apply existing
interpretations to new or unique factual circumstances.”111 The Chamber of
Commerce has also provided some guidelines for this new proposed
policy.112 It recommends that the SEC should use its administrative
proceedings when the matter is “based upon well-established legal principles
that have been adopted by Article III courts,” when the facts of the allegation
are similar to those that have been adjudicated in previous enforcement
actions, and when the matter does not subject the respondent to “an extensive
investigative record” that he or she could not possibly review in its entirety
within the allotted time given for discovery by the Code of Federal
Regulations (C.F.R.).113
The Chamber of Commerce acknowledges that this recommendation is
contrary to the belief that regulatory agencies have expertise over certain
matters and laws and thus should have the power to interpret the laws that
105. See RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 3.
106. Id. at 9.
107. Id. at 2.
108. See id. at 8.
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they promulgate.114 However, the Supreme Court has previously stated that a
government can still benefit from the expertise of agencies without being
ruled by them.115 It may be time to recognize that the benefits of consistent
laws outweigh the risks of allowing federal agencies to create and interpret
new laws without a review and check by a federal judiciary.116 The SEC is
given broad discretion when choosing a forum, and Congress has not
supplied any guidelines to the SEC on how to make this choice.117 Recently,
the SEC has been hearing more cases under its own administrative
proceedings.118 The SEC brought over 80% of enforcement actions within its
administrative proceedings, rather than federal court, in the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2014, while ten years ago the SEC brought less than 50% of
cases within its administrative proceedings.119
Other than the efficiency and ease of bringing a case in an administrative
proceeding instead of district court, the high rate of success is also a recently
apparent factor behind the SEC’s choice of forum. “In the 12 months through
September [2014], the SEC won all six contested administrative hearings
where verdicts were issued, but only 61%—11 out of 18—federal-court
trials.”120 Perhaps in an effort to address the current criticism, the SEC’s
Division of Enforcement posted a document on the SEC website entitled,
“Division of Enforcement Approach to Forum Selection in Contested
Actions” in May 2015.121 The SEC admitted that although “there is no rigid
formula dictating the choice of forum,” it does consider certain factors when
making its choice and applies them on a case-by-case basis.122 Four of the
factors listed in this document were: (1) “the availability of the desired
claims, legal theories, and forms of relief in each forum;” (2) whether the
respondent is registered with the SEC or associated with an entity registered
with the SEC; (3) the costs, resources, and time of litigation in each forum;
and (4) which forum could provide a “fair, consistent, and effective
resolution of securities law issues and matters.”123
While these factors may shed some light on the reasoning behind the
SEC’s choice of forum, they still do not provide a concrete procedure that it
must follow. Such a procedure could be critical in not only protecting a
respondent’s due process rights, but also in ensuring the integrity of the SEC.
114. See id. at 18–19.
115. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010).
116. See RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 19.
117. See id.
118. See Eaglesham, SEC Steering More Trials, supra note 5.
119. Eaglesham, supra note 2.
120. Eaglesham, SEC Steering More Trials, supra note 5.
121. Division of Enforcement Approach to Forum Selection in Contested Actions, SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcement-approach-
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In March 2015, SEC Commissioner Michael Piwowar publicly recognized
that the SEC should issue choice of forum guidelines, which many critics
believe would be beneficial to the SEC’s public perception.124 Instituting
guidelines would bring transparency to the choice of forum process and help
deter the recent criticisms that the SEC brings cases within its own
administrative process “just to increase its winning record.”125
2. Recommendation Two: Choice of Forum Procedure for
Respondents
Another of the Chamber of Commerce’s recommendations also concerns
choice of forum, but focuses on the respondent’s complete lack of input in
the forum selection.126 Although the SEC may choose to bring a case either
within its own administrative proceedings or in federal district court, the
respondent has no say in the matter.127 The respondent must comply with the
SEC’s decision, and can only bring the matter to a federal court of appeals
once the SEC makes a final decision.128 Thus, the Chamber of Commerce
recommends that the SEC “should create a procedure to enable respondents
to challenge the choice of forum by filing a motion for change of forum with
the Commission prior to institution of the proceeding.”129
The Chamber of Commerce has proposed guidelines that provide
respondents with a “procedural opportunity” to contest the SEC’s
discretion.130 First, once the SEC chooses to bring the case in an
administrative proceeding, it must notify the parties and allow them to file a
“motion for reconsideration of the forum decision.”131 If the SEC grants the
motion, then it will allow the Division of Enforcement to “submit a new
recommendation to the Commission for authorization of a civil action.”132 If
the SEC denies the motion, then the Division of Enforcement will have the
opportunity to “file an order instituting proceedings.”133
While this recommendation attempts to mirror traditional court
proceedings by giving the respondent some say in the choice of forum in
which the case can be heard, it is very unlikely that the SEC will adopt any
sort of procedure that will allow a respondent to challenge its choice of
forum. One of the main reasons that the SEC brings cases “within its own
walls” is the speed of the administrative proceedings.134 It is more likely to
124. See Heading to Court, supra note 82.
125. Id.
126. See RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 19.
127. See id.
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2012).
129. RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 19.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 20.
132. Id. at 19–20.
133. Id. at 20.
134. See Approach to Forum Selection, supra note 121.
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bring a case in the administrative forum because it can use its resources more
effectively and hold hearings more quickly.135 Allowing respondents to
challenge this choice would only delay the proceedings and cause one of the
key factors for bringing an action within administrative proceedings to be
irrelevant.
3. Recommendation Four: Sufficient Discovery and
Depositions
An additional Chamber of Commerce recommendation deals with the
SEC’s Rules of Practice generally, with an emphasis on pre-trial discovery
and depositions.136 The Chamber of Commerce notes that the Rules of
Practice have not been substantially amended since 1993, and now that
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank have substantially expanded the SEC’s
authority and reach, it may be time for an update.137 The current procedures
in place allow the SEC to perform extensive discovery before serving an
order on the respondent, and therefore, once the SEC decides to initiate an
enforcement action, it has already accumulated an “extensive investigative
record.”138 While it is possible for ALJs to issue subpoenas, they often do not
since they only have a maximum of 300 days to file an initial decision from
the date of the service.139 Under this timeline, which is already the longest
and most beneficial available to respondents within an administrative
proceeding, there are approximately four months between the issuance of an
order and the hearing, roughly two months for both parties to obtain the
transcript and submit briefs, and then approximately another four months
after the briefing for the hearing officer or ALJ to make the initial decision.140
When these rules were adopted, neither Congress nor the SEC anticipated
the complex and fact-intensive cases that are now brought within the SEC’s
administrative proceedings. Given the mass quantities of electronic
documents produced in discovery, and the fact that respondents have only
four months to review and analyze such documents,141 timelines for review
must be extended. This recommendation is perhaps the most reasonable out
of the three discussed in this Note. SEC General Counsel Anne Small
recently acknowledged that since the SEC has been granted extensive
authority to hear more cases, especially those involving insider trading, it is
135. See id.
136. See RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 21.
137. See id. at 21; see also Dodd-Frank Act Reinforces SEC, supra note 33 (explaining that
Congress originally gave the SEC the power to impose civil money penalties only on those persons
who were directly regulated by the SEC, such as broker-dealers and investment advisers, but now
under Dodd-Frank, the SEC can impose such remedies on any person).
138. RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 20.
139. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2) (2016).
140. Id.
141. See RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 16.
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“entirely reasonable” to make changes in the procedures to reflect the current
situation in order to “make sure the process is fair.”142
This recommendation also stresses that if the SEC were to extend the
time permitted for pre-trial discovery, then it only makes sense to increase
the overall time allotted for the completion of an administrative
proceeding.143 The Chamber of Commerce suggested that if the SEC
compiles an extensive record before it initiates an action, or if “it is clear that
the respondent is entitled to adequate pre-trial discovery to ensure a fair and
impartial proceeding,” then it should increase the time apportioned to the
hearing.144
The Chamber of Commerce further proposed that “[t]he rules should also
require all evidence introduced to be based on personal knowledge of the
witnesses or the creator of the document, unless subject to specific exceptions
to well-established evidentiary exclusion rules.”145 This recommendation
stems from another common criticism of the administrative process, which is
its permissible use of hearsay. The SEC Rules of Practice’s regulation
regarding the admissibility of evidence is extremely vague. It allows the
Commission or the hearing officer to “receive relevant evidence and shall
exclude all evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious.”146
This diverges from the Federal Rules of Evidence, which do not permit the
admission of hearsay evidence, outside of certain limited exceptions,147 and
proclaim that a witness may only testify to a matter if he or she has sufficient
knowledge of that matter, as supported by evidence.148
IV. SEC PROPOSED AND ADOPTED AMENDMENTS TO THE
RULES OF PRACTICE
On October 5, 2015 the SEC responded to the various criticisms of its
administrative proceedings, and perhaps also to the Chamber of Commerce’s
recommendations, by announcing proposed amendments to its Rules of
Practice.149 After taking public comments into consideration, the SEC issued
its final amendments on July 29, 2016, which became effective on September
142. Daniel Wilson, SEC Administrative Case Rules Likely Out of Date, GC Says, LAW360 (June
17, 2014, 5:55 PM), http://www.law360.com/banking/articles/548907/sec-gc-praises-analysis-im
porvements-after-rule-disputes.
143. See RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 21.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 17 C.F.R. § 201.320 (2016).
147. See FED. R. EVID. 802. The Federal Rules of Evidence define “hearsay” as “a statement that:
(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(1)–(2).
148. FED. R. EVID.602.
149. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,091 (proposed
Oct. 5, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201).
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27, 2016.150 The overall thrust of the amendments focuses on the timeline of
hearings, the time allotted for discovery and depositions, and the rules
concerning hearsay.151 While the amendments make changes to various rules
under C.F.R. Part 201, for the purpose of this Note, the discussion will
concern Rules 360, 233, and 320.
A. RULE 360
The SEC proposed to amend Rule 360, which outlines the timelines for
the pre-hearing period, the hearing, the post-hearing brief-submitting period,
and the initial decision filing, in three ways.152 As discussed earlier, a hearing
officer can choose, at its discretion, from three different time periods within
which to file his or her initial decision: 120 days, 210 days, or 300 days.153
Previously in the Rules of Practice, this timeline began on the date of service
of an order instituting proceedings (OIP).154 The SEC first proposed to amend
Rule 360(a)(2) by changing the start date of the timeline from the date of
service of an OIP to the “date of completion of post-hearing or dispositive
motion or a finding of a default.”155 The SEC is able to take as much time as
it needs to investigate the matter before it serves the parties involved, while
the respondents only have a limited time for discovery within each particular
timeline.156 Essentially, this amendment would “divorce” the initial decision
deadline from all other phases of the administrative proceeding.157 However,
due to the divorce of these phases, the earlier time periods to file an initial
decision are no longer relevant. Therefore, the SEC further proposed to
amend the designated time period for preparing the initial decision to 30, 75,
or 120 days from the completion of post-hearing or dispositive motion
briefing or a finding of a default.158 In its final rule, the SEC adopted this part
of Rule 360(a)(2) exactly as proposed.159
Second, the proposed amendment to Rule 360(a)(2) expanded the time
period of the pre-hearing stage of the proceeding.160 In the SEC’s proposal,
it doubled the maximum time period from four months to eight months under
its 120-day timeline, increased the time period from two-and-a-half to six
months under the 75-day timeline, and quadrupled the time period from one
month to fourth months under the 30-day timeline.161 The SEC hoped that
150. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. 50,212 (July 29,
2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201).
151. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,091.
152. See id. at 60,091–92.
153. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2) (2016).
154. See id.
155. Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 50,213.
156. See RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 20.
157. Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,092.
158. Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 50,213.
159. See id. at 50,214.
160. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,092.
161. Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 50,213.
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this amendment, by increasing the length of the proceeding’s pre-hearing
period, would satisfy the critics’ pleas for change because it provided more
time for respondents to conduct depositions and review electronic
documents.162 However, this extended maximum timeline still was not
enough to satisfy the commenters to the proposals.163 Therefore, in its final
rule, the SEC modified Rule 360 to allow a hearing to commence within a
maximum of ten months—instead of the proposed eight—after the date of
service under the 120-day timeline.164 The SEC amended Rule 360 as to 75-
and 30-day timelines as proposed.165
Third, the SEC proposed to amend Rule 360(a)(3) to allow a hearing
officer to “extend the initial decision deadline by up to 30 days for case
management purposes.”166 The SEC intended to allow flexibility for hearing
officers, who may have to issue many initial decisions within the same time
frame.167 The hearing officer must issue the extension no later than thirty days
before the expiration of the initial decision deadline; however, if the SEC
does not agree with the extension, it must issue an order to the contrary within
fourteen days after receiving the certification for extension.168 If the SEC
does not issue a contrary order, then the extension shall take effect.169 In its
final rule, the SEC adopted Rule 360(a)(3) as proposed.170
B. RULE 233
The SEC also proposed to amend Rule 233, which concerns the
procedure of conducting depositions during the pre-hearing phase.171
Previously, a party was only permitted to take a deposition of a witness if the
witness was unable to testify at the hearing.172 However, the proposed rule
would allow both parties to conduct a limited number of additional witness
depositions, even of witnesses that will attend the hearing.173 There is a cap,
however, on how many depositions each party can conduct.174 Under a 120-
day timeline, if the proceeding involves one respondent, then the respondent
162. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,092.
163. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 50,213 (noting that
many commentators argued for pre-hearing periods of twelve or eighteen months and some
advocated to give hearing officers the discretion to set the pre-hearing period and grant extensions
of the period on a case-by-case basis).
164. Id. at 50,214.
165. See id.
166. Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,104.
167. See id. at 60,092.
168. Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 50,215.
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.233 (2016).
172. See id. § 201.233(a).
173. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,091, 60,092
(proposed Oct. 5, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201).
174. See id.
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and the SEC are each allowed to conduct up to three depositions. If the
proceeding involves more than one respondent, then the SEC is allowed up
to five depositions, and the respondents collectively may conduct up to
five.175 The SEC hoped that this amendment would allow parties to develop
their arguments more fully and condense the issues that will be examined
during the hearing.176 Although many commenters urged the SEC to further
increase the number of depositions allowed to each side to mirror the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows ten depositions per side or per
party,177 the SEC adopted the amendment as proposed in its final rule, with
some minor adjustments.178 The final rule allows either party to move for two
additional depositions, which will be granted at the hearing officer’s
discretion, taking into consideration whether the matter contains unique
issues or facts.179 The final rule also imposes a seven-hour time limit to
depositions, instead of the originally proposed six.180
C. RULE 320
Lastly, the SEC proposed to amend Rule 320, which concerns the
admissibility of evidence.181 The previous rule states, “[t]he Commission or
the hearing officer . . . shall exclude all evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial
or unduly repetitious.”182 The amendment would add “unreliable” to the end
of the list of types of excluded evidence.183 However, despite the Chamber of
Commerce’s urging, the SEC did not actually prohibit the admission of
hearsay evidence, but instead added a new Rule 320(b) to clarify that it can
only be permitted “if it is relevant, material, and bears satisfactory indicia of
reliability so that its use is fair.”184 Therefore, under this regime, hearsay is
still admissible, but it now must pass a stricter threshold of reliability. The
SEC adopted the amendments to Rule 320 as proposed.185
V. SOLUTION: FURTHER AMENDMENTS TO THE SEC RULES
OF PRACTICE
Many critiques of the SEC’s administrative proceedings concern their
short timeframe, the informal process by which the SEC chooses a forum,
and the admissibility of hearsay evidence. These criticisms boil down to the
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2).
178. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. 50,212, 50,216 (July
29, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,095.
182. 17 C.F.R. § 201.320 (2016).
183. Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,095.
184. Id.
185. See generally Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 50,226.
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overall fairness of the administrative proceedings and whether these
proceedings violate a respondent’s right to due process by not providing them
with a meaningful judicial review of their claims.186 To ensure that its
administrative process is fair, the SEC should amend the Rules of Practice to
further provide a lengthened timeline for administrative proceedings,
increase the scope of discovery practices, preclude the admissibility of
hearsay, and require a rigid choice of forum procedure.
A. EXTEND THE LENGTH OFADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
The SEC’s recent amendment to Rule 360 to expand the time period of
each administrative proceeding will likely not be sufficient. Time becomes
increasingly important for respondents during the pre-hearing period, during
which discovery is conducted. The SEC is able to obtain a comprehensive
investigative record, through investigation of a respondent’s records and
issuance of investigative subpoenas, before ever initiating an enforcement
action.187 However, respondents have only a few months, even under the new
amendments, to gather all of the facts they need to build a defense.188
The SEC’s chief argument supporting in-house proceedings is the speed
of the process.189 However, the SEC has often been criticized for its delay in
completing enforcement investigations.190 Dodd-Frank amended the
Securities Exchange Act by requiring SEC staff to file an action against a
party within 180 days after providing that party with an initial written
notification of a potential violation.191 The SEC is allowed, however, to
extend this time period by another 180 days if the case is overly complex.192
This shows that the SEC essentially has an investigative advantage before
initiating an action, and then further has the authority to extend its
investigation another six months. On the other hand, under the 120-day
timeline, the respondent, after receiving the OIP, only has ten months
maximum to conduct discovery, and that is only if the SEC decides to grant
that extended time. 193 The SEC elucidated in a footnote that not every 120-
day matter brought by the SEC will qualify for the maximum ten-month
period.194 It explained that the decision is within the hearing officer’s
186. See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 214 (1994).
187. See RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 20.
188. Id.; see also Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 50,214.
189. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 50,214 (“While we
recognize that some might view the maximum ten-month prehearing period as not long enough, the
Commission believes that the final rule strikes the appropriate balance between the time needed to
conduct discovery and prepare for a hearing and the Commission’s goal of timely and efficiently
resolving administrative proceedings.”).
190. See Dodd-Frank Act Reinforces SEC, supra note 33.
191. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 929U, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5 (2012)).
192. Dodd-Frank Act Reinforces SEC, supra note 33.
193. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 50,214.
194. See id. at 50,214 n.18.
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discretion, considering factors such as the number of securities law
violations, the size of the investigative record, and the facts behind the
allegations.195 The SEC stressed that “the maximum prehearing period should
be the exception rather than the norm.”196 Additionally, although this limited
amount of discovery may have been sufficient in the past, in today’s
technological world that is no longer the case. In some cases, especially those
concerning more complex issues, respondents could have millions of pages
to review because of the use of electronic documents.197 While increasing the
time for pre-hearing discovery is an improvement, this amendment is a far
cry from how much time is allotted in a district court case, which is
oftentimes a year or longer, and the amendment does not extend the time
enough for a respondent to formulate a strong defense.198
The Chamber of Commerce presented only a general recommendation
regarding the extension of the pre-hearing time period, but it strongly
advocated that this revision was necessary due to the SEC’s broadened
authority under Dodd-Frank, its experience with the use of its administrative
proceedings, the increased amount of investigation materials, and, of course,
to ensure an unbiased forum.199 Thus, the SEC should further amend Rule
360 to allow for a pre-hearing discovery time of twelve months, on a case-
by-case basis, giving each side the option of extending this time another two
months, depending on the complexity of the case. Additionally, if the
respondent moves to extend the time period and the hearing officer denies
the request, the respondent should have the ability to appeal to the SEC,
which must then decide whether to grant or deny the extension within thirty
days. This amount of time for discovery is necessary, especially in matters
with complex issues or those with millions of documents stored electronically
that respondents must sift through.200 This extension will make the
administrative process fairer and protect the respondent’s due process rights.
B. INCREASE THEAMOUNT OF PERMITTEDDEPOSITIONS
An additional concern with the restricted discovery within an
administrative proceeding is the inadequate amount of depositions permitted
to respondents. While the SEC has taken a small step in amending Rule 233
to allow parties to take depositions of witnesses who will also testify in the
hearing, this small change is not enough.201 The rule “does not even come
close to leveling the playing field” since it allows for the same amount of
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. See RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 16.
198. See William F. Johnson, SEC Behind Times in ‘Modernizing’ Administrative Proceedings,
N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202741460509/SEC-Behind-
Times-in-Modernizing-Administrative-Proceedings?slreturn=20151021135531.
199. RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 20.
200. See id. at 16.
201. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 50,216.
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depositions for both the respondents and the SEC, yet this amount of
depositions is hardly enough for a respondent to collect all relevant facts.202
Since such a small number of depositions are allowed, “figuring out which
witnesses to depose may involve a large degree of guesswork if the agency
took testimony from a number of people in its investigation, as is often the
case.”203 Further, while respondents have only months to conduct discovery
and build a defense, it has been shown that the SEC, in most cases, already
had years to investigate the matter and construct its investigative record.204
To correct this incongruity, the SEC should instead amend its Rules of
Practice by allowing each party to an action to conduct six depositions. This
change should also apply to cases where there is more than one respondent;
respondents within the same case should be allowed six depositions each, not
collectively. This number of depositions brings the Rules of Practice closer
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s rule of allowing ten depositions to
each party, and also maintains the SEC’s interest in conducting timely and
efficient administrative proceedings.205 Since this solution has already
extended the pre-hearing discovery period, then the parties will surely have
time to conduct more depositions and bring more concise issues to court,
which will ensure a speedier hearing period.
C. PROHIBIT THEADMISSIBILITY OFHEARSAY
One of the major critiques of the SEC’s amendments is that they still
allow hearsay as admissible evidence.206 The first problem with hearsay is
that the process by which it is permitted is completely subjective; the ALJs
have complete discretion to decide whether or not evidence is relevant,
material, and reliable.207 The second problem is that even under amended
Rule 320, various statements that were made outside of the hearing may still
be permissible within an SEC proceeding without having the speaker attend
the hearing at all.208 This process eliminates the opportunity for cross-
examination, where a witness could possibly admit something contradicting
202. Johnson, supra note 198.
203. Peter J. Henning, A Small Step in Changing S.E.C. Administrative Proceedings, N.Y. TIMES
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prior testimony and thus lose credibility.209 Finally, when the SEC has
already had ample opportunity to gather evidence before commencing a
proceeding, then allowing hearsay only intensifies the lack of fairness and
equality between respondents and the SEC.210
To fix this subjective element of administrative proceedings, the SEC
should adopt hearsay procedures according to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Although under the Administrative Procedure Act agencies are allowed to
permit hearsay,211 in a time when the SEC is under scrutiny from parties,
attorneys, and the interested public, it should have taken this opportunity to
create “an administrative fact-finding system that distinguishes itself in a
positive way, instead of hiding behind an archaic, unfair process.”212 To
continue to allow hearsay within administrative proceedings in this manner
is to continue an unfair process where ALJs have complete discretion to
decide which evidence is reliable.
D. IMPLEMENT FORMAL PROCEDURE FOR CHOOSING A FORUM
Finally, in order to remedy the broad discretion that the SEC has when
choosing a forum, as well as the securities law consistency problem, the SEC
should adopt a formal procedure for determining whether to bring a case in
its own administrative proceedings or in federal district court. One of the
largest criticisms of the SEC is the high frequency with which it adjudicates
cases within its own administrative proceedings and the high probability of
SEC success when a case is brought within its own walls.213
The Chamber of Commerce has suggested a framework and the SEC has
provided the public with factors it considers when choosing a forum.214
However, there has yet to be an official process that the SEC is required to
follow. In fact, within the SEC’s official document that provides the approach
used to select a forum, it states that “[t]here is no rigid formula” to forum
selection and that it “may in its discretion consider any or all of the factors in
assessing” which forum to choose.215 Implementing a formal procedure will
not only help rebuild public confidence in the SEC and its administrative
proceedings, but it will also help remedy the inconsistency between
administrative and judicial interpretations of securities laws.
209. Id.
210. See Johnson, supra note 198.
211. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012) (“Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the
agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly
repetitious evidence.”).
212. Johnson, supra note 198.
213. See Eaglesham, supra note 2.
214. See RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES, supra note 6, at 18; see also Approach
to Forum Selection, supra note 121.
215. Approach to Forum Selection, supra note 121.
232 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 11
The first two criteria that the SEC considers when selecting a forum do
not seem to raise any new controversy.216 They provide that the SEC should
examine the availability of claims, legal theories, and relief in each forum
and whether the charged party is a registered entity.217 However, the second
two still seem to give the SEC too much discretion in choosing a forum, and
that is if the SEC even elects to consider them. The third and fourth guidelines
concern the efficient use of the SEC’s “limited resources” and the “fair,
consistent, and effective resolution of securities law issues and matters.”218
Each of these general factors, when analyzed by the SEC, blatantly weighs
in favor of its own administrative proceedings. The in-house administrative
process is more time and cost efficient, at least according to the SEC, and the
SEC also asserts that it is the better entity to decide discrepancies in securities
laws.219 However, both of these contentions are debatable.
First, the cost and time efficiency of SEC administrative proceedings has
been recently disputed. Although the procedures offered by the Rules of
Practice technically provide for a quicker proceeding than those offered in
federal court, a respondent in an administrative proceeding frequently must
wait years until there is a hearing to review the facts and legal theories within
the case.220 Second, the SEC’s assertion that it is the better forum to decide
the interpretation of securities laws is seriously misguided.221 The Chamber
of Commerce’s recommended framework urges that the SEC should only use
its own administrative proceedings if the matter concerns legal principles that
have already been decided by federal courts or if there is precedent within
the SEC’s administrative proceedings.222
The proposed rigid forum selection procedure solidifies the SEC’s four
suggested guidelines, and then also adds sub-criteria to the third and fourth
prongs, which will consider the length of the investigative record as well as
which forum would provide for a consistent development of securities law.
When the SEC is considering the cost and time efficiency of a certain forum,
it cannot just take its own needs into consideration; it must also consider the
respondent’s need for depositions, witness testimony, and time to review
electronic documents. Although the SEC provided that it might take these
factors into consideration, it also asserted that it does not have to.223 Under
this formal framework, the SEC would be required to realistically assess, on
a case-by-case basis, whether an administrative proceeding provides the
respondent with adequate time for pre-hearing discovery.224
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The SEC should also integrate the Chamber of Commerce’s suggestions
into the fourth prong of its suggested approach to forum selection. The SEC
asserted that its own proceedings are the appropriate forum to address
questions of federal securities laws or interpretations of SEC rules, while
federal courts are typically only appropriate when the matter concerns a state
law or “specialized areas of federal law.”225 However, using administrative
proceedings to develop securities law provides for an “unchecked expansion
of existing legal policy that is not adequately overseen for a truly impartial
third-party judicial forum.”226
This solution affirms the Chamber of Commerce’s emphasis that the SEC
should resist using its administrative proceedings to develop new law and
make an effort to not abuse the choice of forum power granted by Dodd-
Frank.227 Although the SEC is an expert in securities law, and should no
doubt be deferred to for certain issues, its authority over the securities law is
not absolute. A government can still benefit from agency expertise “without
being ruled by experts.”228 Therefore, when choosing a forum, the SEC
should select its administrative proceedings only if the matter concerns an
established legal principle implemented by federal courts, or if the alleged
violations are similar to those already adjudicated and upheld in previous
SEC enforcement actions.229
CONCLUSION
Through recent amendments to its Rules of Practice, conceivably in
response to the recommendations by the Chamber of Commerce, the SEC has
taken a small step in increasing the fairness, consistency, and transparency of
its administrative proceedings. However, that step may not have been big
enough. In order to truly ensure that the SEC does not abuse its choice of
forum power, and that its administrative proceedings are indeed fair to all
parties (if chosen), the SEC must first further revise its Rules of Practice to
extend the time provided for discovery. In order to counteract the advantage
gained by the SEC as a result of a pre-discovery investigation, the SEC
should allow for a pre-hearing discovery time of twelve months, on a case-
by-case basis, giving the SEC and respondents the option of a two-month
extension. Second, the Rules of Practice should also be amended to increase
the amount of permitted depositions to six for each party. This change brings
the Rules of Practice closer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus
allows respondents of a complex case the opportunity to build a stronger
defense. Third, the SEC should adopt hearsay procedures more closely
aligned with the Federal Rules of Evidence. This is preferable to the current
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solution, which is to simply attach “unreliable” to the end of the of the
excluded evidence list. Finally, instead of only providing an unofficial set of
guidelines, with factors that the SEC may choose to consider at its own
discretion, the SEC should implement a formal procedure for choosing a
forum. Without the aforementioned changes, the SEC will continue to abuse
its regulatory power and consumer and investor confidence in the SEC will
surely diminish even further.
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